Recently, Trusteer came across a new configuration of the Carberp Trojan that targets Facebook users to commit financial fraud.
Unlike previous Facebook attacks designed to steal user credentials from the log-in page, this version attempts to steal money by duping the user into divulging an e-cash voucher.
Carberp replaces any Facebook page the user navigates to with a fake page notifying the victim that his/her Facebook account is “temporarily locked”. The page asks the user for their first name, last name, email, date of birth, password and a Ukash 20 euro (approximately $25 US) voucher number to “confirm verification” of their identity and unlock the account.
The page claims the cash voucher will be “added to the user’s main Facebook account balance”, which is obviously not the case. Instead, the voucher number is transferred to the Carberp bot master who presumably uses it as a cash equivalent (Ukash provides anonymity similar to that offered by cash payments), thus effectively defrauding the user of 20 euro/$25.
“This clever man-in-the-browser (MitB) attack exploits the trust users have with the Facebook website and the anonymity of e-cash vouchers,” said Trusteer’s CTO Amit Klein. “Unlike attacks against online banking applications that require transferring money to another account which creates an auditable trail, this new Carberp attack allows fraudsters to use or sell the e-cash vouchers immediately anywhere they are accepted on the internet.”
Attacking social networks like Facebook provides cybercriminals with a large pool of victims that can be fairly easily tricked into divulging confidential account information, and even, as illustrated in this case, giving up their cash.
With the growing adoption of e-cash on the internet, Trusteer expects to see more of these attacks. Like card not present fraud, where cybercriminals use stolen debit and credit card information to make illegal online purchases without the risk of being caught, e-cash fraud is a low risk form of crime. With e-cash, however, it is the account holder not the financial institution who assumes the liability for fraudulent transactions.
“To end users we recommend – as always – be suspicious of odd/non-conventional requests even when they seem to originate from a trusted web site,” concluded Klein. “Also consider using browser-based security tools like Trusteer Rapport that secure communication between the computer and target website to block MitB attack methods like HTML injection and prevent keylogging from grabbing data.”