Leszek Miś is the founder of Defensive Security, a principal trainer and security researcher with over 15 years of experience. Next week, he’s running an amazing online training course – In & Out – Network Exfiltration and Post-Exploitation Techniques [RED Edition] at HITBSecConf 2020 Singapore, so it was the perfect time for an interview.
What are the main characteristics of modern adversary behavior? What should enterprise security teams be on the lookout for?
This is a very open question as it depends on the attacker’s skillset and offensive experience. Modern adversaries like to behave in various ways. Don’t forget it’s also closely related to what the target is, and the attacker’s budget.
From what we are seeing in the wild, in most cases an adversary uses a combination of publicly available tools like RATs, offensive C2 frameworks powered up by a big amount of post-exploitation, and lateral movement modules, along with advanced and well-known tactics, techniques and procedures. The goal is to get initial access to the network, pivot over the systems, networks or even OS processes, escalate the privileges if needed, find out the interesting data assets, copy and hide them (sometimes in very unusual network locations), and eventually persist and exfiltrate the data by using a different set of communication channels.
Advanced attackers like to blend into network traffic of the target to become even more stealthy. Adversaries also like to make major modifications to open source tools for making detection harder. CVEs in the form of 0-day or 1-day exploits are often in use.
Big network environments are very hard to maintain and even understand – attackers are very good at that. Proved protection and detection are hard to achieve too. One single parameter or argument visible from the process list could make a significant difference
That’s the reason why companies should constantly test their environments against TTPs. The baseline profiling of your core network components, OS, devices and apps, adversary simulations, achieving full visibility and analytics across many different network data sources, correlation, and understanding of how each component affects the other one seems like a good approach for dealing with cybersecurity risks.
It’s not about if, it’s about when you will become a target. You need to be prepared. That’s the reason why at least understanding of publicly available offensive tools and techniques is crucial in the fight against attackers. We have to train, and learn new stuff every single day as attackers do. We have to test our assumptions in the field of purple teaming where two teams: the red one and the blue one work together simulating real threats and doing detection research at the same time. Without threat hunting, you are blind.
Based on what the market is saying, having a dedicated defensive/offensive training environment ready to use out-of-the-box is a good path that allows us to be prepared. We cannot, however, do much without:
- Understanding what the real threat is
- Solid technological base
- Skilled teams and risk-aware management
- Being up to date
- Dedicated budget for training
- Research time
- Desire to learn.
Based on your experience, what are the most significant misconceptions when it comes to network exfiltration? What are training attendees mostly surprised about?
The most significant misconception when it comes to network exfiltration is incorrect believing that something is impossible without checking: “This box does not have direct internet access so you can’t steal data from it.” Really? That’s the power of the pivoting and the lateral movement phase. During an adversary simulation, it’s always the case.
Show me or let me simulate your scenario and I’ll understand. Training attendees are surprised mostly about two things. The first is the ease of performing certain elements of the attack and the number of possibilities. The second one is related to chained attack scenarios. Whenever you are skilled enough to combine / chain together different techniques, tools, or “exotic” communication channels – you are the winner. You have to spend lots of hours playing to understand and make a progress.
“Feeling the network” is very important. I found also as a very surprising number of possibilities in terms of using valid, normal network channels like cloud-based services for exfiltration or C2. SSH over a Google service? Data exfiltration over Dropbox? C2 over a Slack channel? Is it really possible and so easy at the same time?
What’s your take on using open source tools within an enterprise security architecture?
I have two points of view, they are related to the offensive and defensive side and both are positive. In short, I believe they should be a part of every company’s cybersecurity strategy.
From the offensive perspective, it’s amazing how many free open source tools help with the execution of adversary simulations, penetration testing services or just doing research. Open source delivers flexibility – and I am sure most of the red teamers use or create open source projects while working for large companies. It’s a great value for everyone. Recently, blue teams have started doing the same and we’re seeing some powerful knowledge out there.
From a defensive point of view, OSS is in use almost everywhere and assuming that even if a huge part of the enterprise infrastructure is based on commercial products, you will find open source components. Many commercial products would not be possible without OSS.
I am a big supporter of having critical, security areas covered by OSS. Just to name a few: Zeek IDS, Suricata IDS, Moloch, OSquery and Kolide Fleet, ModSecurity as WAF, Volatility Framework for memory analysis, auditd, iptables, LKRG for Linux kernel hardening, Graylog, Wazuh / OSSEC, (H)ELK, eBPF, theHive, MISP, Sigma rules – it is impossible to list all of them here. These are all very stable projects that can be used as supporting technology or for creating your own SOC environment from scratch. Big kudos to the open source community!
What advice would you give to those just entering the cybersecurity industry and want to work in security operations? What skills should they develop?
Based on my experience I would say that learning the basics is key, without a solid foundation you’ll never understand how things work. I would suggest learning how the network works, how Linux internals work. You should patch and compile your own Linux kernel, and play with system rootkits trying to detect them from the defensive side.
The same small step approach applies to a Windows infrastructure: AD internals, LDAP, Kerberos, GPO, DNS, etc. – all of them matter. At the same time, you could learn virtualization techniques and start doing your first programming steps to eventually get into exploitation or reversing. Making your own research lab or using ready-to-use platforms like PurpleLabs should give you a nice acceleration.
The short and simple answer does not exist, but stubbornness, discernment, enthusiasm, an open mind, hard work, and thousands of hours spent at the computer learning new stuff will eventually allow you to choose the right path in the cybersecurity world.